UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-12-2021

State v. Garritson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 47868

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State v. Garritson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 47868" (2021). Not Reported. 6856.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6856

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
4/12/2021 1:14 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 47868-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
) Bingham County Case No.
v.
) CR06-19-3606
)
AMERY HOPE GARRITSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BINGHAM
________________________
HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON
District Judge
________________________

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
COLLEEN D. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................................................1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................................................1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ..................................................1
ISSUE ..............................................................................................................................................6
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................7
Garritson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred
By Denying Her Motion To Suppress .................................................................................7
A.

Introduction ..............................................................................................................7

B.

Standard Of Review .................................................................................................7

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Garritson’s Motion
To Suppress ..............................................................................................................8
1.

Amery’s Refusal To Leave The Casino Lobby .........................................11

2.

Amery’s Recovery Of, And Refusal To Drop,
The Keys ....................................................................................................13

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

D.C. v. Wesby, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) ..................................................................... 9
Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1969) .................................................................. 8
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003)...................................................................................... 8
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 916 P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................ 7
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) .................................................................. 9
State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 194 P.3d 550 (Ct. App. 2008).................................................. 8
State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 206 P.3d 501 (Ct. App. 2009).................................................. 8
State v. Gamma, 143 Idaho 751, 152 P.3d 622 (Ct. App. 2006) .................................................. 10
State v. George, 127 Idaho 693, 905 P.2d 626 (1995) .................................................................. 10
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2005) ..................................................... 9
State v. Hallenbeck, 141 Idaho 596, 114 P.3d 154 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................................. 10
State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 36 P.3d 1287 (Ct. App. 2001) .................................................... 10
State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 922 P.3d 1059 (1996) ................................................................ 8, 9
State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 824 P.2d 894 (Ct. App. 1991) ................................................... 8
State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 27 P.3d 873 (Ct. App. 2001) ................................................ 10
State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 755 P.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1988) .......................................... 9, 10
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) .................................................................................................. 12
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) ......................................................................................... 8
Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968) ....................................................................... 10
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963)....................................................................................... 10

ii

STATUTES

PAGE

I.C. § 18-705 ............................................................................................................................. 9, 10
I.C. § 18-7008(2)(a) ...................................................................................................................... 11
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. amend. IV .................................................................................................................... 8

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Amery Hope Garritson appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon her
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Specifically, she challenges the district
court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In August 2019, Fort Hall Casino employees called the police after observing, on
surveillance video, an individual drop what appeared to be a methamphetamine pipe on the casino
floor. (R., p.162; State’s Exhibit A, 0:00-1:41. 1) The pipe was recovered by casino security
personnel and given to police. (State’s Exhibit A, 1:30-1:40.) Officer Juan Arellano responded to
the scene, observed the surveillance video, and then made contact with the individual, who was
identified as Casey Garritson. 2 (R., p.162; State’s Exhibit A, 0:00-4:45.)
While Officer Arellano was confronting him about the dropped pipe, Casey handed several
objects to his daughter Amery Garritson, who was standing nearby. (R., p.162; State’s Exhibit A,
4:34-4:54.) The objects appeared to include a stack of folded money, a cell phone, and another
object. (R., p.162; State’s Exhibit A, 4:34-4:58.) Officer Arellano told Casey, while still in
Amery’s presence, not to hand anything else off to Amery without permission. (R., p.162; State’s

1

In addition to the officer body cam videos of the incident, and the transcript of the hearing on the
motion to suppress, the state cites to the district court’s order denying Garritson’s motion to
suppress in the Statement of Facts section of this brief. With the exception of one finding in the
order, which appears to have been made inadvertently, and which the state does not rely upon in
this brief, Garritson does not challenge any of these factual findings. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7,
n.7.)
2

Because they share a last name, the state refers to Casey and Amery Garritson by their first names
in this brief.
1

Exhibit A, 4:58-5:10; Supp. Tr., p.20, Ls.23-25.) Officer Arellano asked Amery to sit outside the
casino lobby, but she did not leave at that time. (Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.5-25; p.20, Ls.2-10; State’s
Exhibit A, 4:53-4:57.) Officer Arellano asked Casey to sit on the floor while he provided relevant
information to dispatch. (R., p.163; State’s Exhibit A, 5:40-6:25) Casey then asked Officer
Arellano if he could give his keys to Amery, but Officer Arellano told him that he could not do so.
(Supp. Tr., p.15, Ls.3-6; State’s Exhibit A, 6:08-6:12.)
Meanwhile, Officer Jeremy Ball approached Amery and asked her what her name was.
(R., p.163; State’s Exhibit B, 0:00-0:45.) Amery argued that she had no part in the incident and
that Officer Ball had no reason to be speaking with her. (R., p.163; State’s Exhibit B, 0:00-1:05.)
Casey and Amery continued to communicate with each other, and the officers, about whether
Amery was being detained. (State’s Exhibit A, 9:40 – 10:35.) Casey also took issue with the
manner in which Officer Ball was speaking with Amery. (Id.)
Amery exited the casino, and Officer Ball followed her outside and asked for her
identification, and where her car was. (R., pp.163-164; State’s Exhibit B, 1:10-1:45.) Officer Ball
also told Amery that she was not under arrest. (R., p.164; State’s Exhibit B, 2:05-2:10.) Amery
continued to express reluctance to speak with Officer Ball, and told him to stop asking her
questions. (R., pp.163-164; State’s Exhibit B, 1:45-2:11.) Officer Ball then re-entered the casino,
leaving Amery outside. (R., p.164; State’s Exhibit B, 2:10-2:30.) Officer Ball told Officer
Arellano that Amery would be excluded from the casino. (R., p.164; State’s Exhibit B, 2:13-2:21.)
Shortly thereafter, Amery re-entered the casino and approached Casey and Officer
Arellano. (R., p.164; State’s Exhibit B, 2:35-2:40.) Officer Ball, who was at that time speaking
with Officer Arellano, told Amery to “step outside and stay out of here.” (R., p.164; State’s Exhibit
B, 2:35-2:45.) Amery did not leave. (State’s Exhibit B, 2:35-2:45.) Then, Casey dropped his
2

keys and kicked them on the floor in Amery’s direction. (R., p.164; State’s Exhibit A, 11:25–
11:39.)
Amery grabbed the keys off of the floor and turned in the direction of the exit. (R., p.165;
State’s Exhibit B, 2:39-2:43.) Officer Ball grabbed Amery’s hand and told her, three times, to
drop the keys. (R., p.165; State’s Exhibit B, 2:40-2:55.) Amery refused to drop the keys and told
Officer Ball that the keys belonged to her. (R., p.165; State’s Exhibit B, 2:40-2:55.) Officer Ball
then pulled Amery’s arm behind her back and told her she was being detained. (R., p.165; State’s
Exhibit B, 2:40 – 3:25.) Only when she was handcuffed did Amery finally drop the keys. (R.,
p.165; State’s Exhibit A, 11:41-12:10.) During this process, Officer Ball asked Amery several
times to put her hands behind her back and to not move her hands. (State’s Exhibit B, 2:50-3:32.)
Casey then charged at Officer Ball, causing Officer Ball to take Casey to the ground. (State’s
Exhibit B, 3:30-4:00.) Officer Arellano was later informed by dispatch that Amery was on
probation. (R., p.165.)
While she was being placed in a patrol vehicle, officers took Amery’s purse. (R., p.165.)
A subsequent search of that purse revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (R., p.166;
Supp. Tr., p.32, L.15 – p.33, L.4.) Officers also found methamphetamine and scales in the vehicle
Casey and Amery arrived to the casino in. (R., p.14.) The state charged Amery with trafficking
in methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting or obstructing officers. (R.,
pp.35-37.)

3

Amery filed a motion to suppress all of her statements and all of the physical evidence
gathered. (R., pp.53-67.) Relevant to this appeal, 3 Amery argued that her arrest was unlawful
because the officers lacked probable cause that she committed the crime of obstructing their lawful
duties. (R., pp.62-64.) The state argued that the officers had probable cause to arrest Amery
because Amery refused their lawful commands to wait outside, refused multiple commands to drop
the keys, refused two commands to place her hands behind her back while being detained, and
resisting officer efforts to double-lock her handcuffs. (R., pp.75-76.) At the hearing on the motion
to suppress, the parties stipulated to admit body cam footage of both Officer Ball and Officer
Arellano, even though Officer Ball had since taken another job in Wyoming and did not testify at
the hearing. (Supp. Tr., p.4, L.18 – p.5, L.5; p.12, Ls.14-22; State’s Exhibits A, B.) Officer
Arellano testified at the hearing. (Supp. Tr., p.6, L.12 – p.21, L.4; p.28, L.23 – p.30, L.13.)
The district court denied Amery’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.89-106.) After making
detailed findings of fact (R., pp.91-95), the court concluded, relevant to this appeal, that the officers
had probable cause to arrest Amery for obstructing or delaying their duties because Amery picked
up the keys and refused to relinquish them despite being present when Officer Arellano told Casey
not to hand her anything. (R., pp.103-104.) The court also found, in the context of its conclusion,
that the search of Amery’s purse was a lawful inventory search, that Amery “reinserted herself
into a situation despite being told to leave.” (R., p.104.) Because the arrest was lawful, the court
concluded, the officers’ subsequent search of Amery’s purse was a valid inventory search. (R.,
pp.175-176.)

3

Amery also argued that even if her arrest was legal, the search of her purse was still unlawful;
and that her statements should be suppressed because officers continued to question her after she
asserted her right to remain silent. (R., pp.53-54, 64-66.) Garritson does not raise these issues on
appeal. (See generally Appellant’s brief.)
4

Amery entered into a plea agreement with the state, preserving her right to appeal the
district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.115-117.) Amery entered a conditional
guilty plea to an amended charge of methamphetamine possession, and the state dismissed the
other two charges. (Id.; ----see also 12/11/19 Tr.) The state also agreed to concur with the sentencing
recommendations of the presentence investigation report. (Id.) The district court imposed a
unified five-year sentence with two years fixed but suspended the sentence and placed Amery on
probation for five years. (R., pp.148-152.) Amery timely appealed. (R., pp.156-159.)

5

ISSUE
Garritson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Garritson’s motion to suppress,
because the State failed to prove that officers had probable cause to arrest her for
resisting or obstructing an officer, and the drug evidence was discovered as a result
of that unlawful arrest?
(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Garritson failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
Garritson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying Her Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Amery Garritson contends that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-16.) Specifically, Amery argues that the district court erred in concluding
that the officers had probable cause to arrest her for obstructing and delaying the exercise of their
duties. (Id.) However, a review of the record and applicable law reveals that the district court
correctly concluded that Amery’s refusal to follow several lawful orders – to leave the casino, and
to drop the keys that were kicked to her by Casey – gave the officers probable cause to arrest her.
Therefore, the district court properly denied Amery’s motion to suppress the contraband
subsequently recovered from her purse pursuant to a valid inventory search.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. Generally, when a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,
561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).

7

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Garritson’s Motion To Suppress
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 4
“[W]arrantless arrests made upon probable cause do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”
State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 349, 194 P.3d 550, 553 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008)). “Probable cause for an arrest is not measured by the same level
of proof required for conviction.” Chapman, 146 Idaho at 351, 194 P.3d at 555 (citation omitted).
Rather, probable cause only “requires that the police possess information that would lead a person
of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime
has been committed by the arrestee.” State v. Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504
(Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). The probable cause determination “depends upon the totality
of the circumstances and the assessment of probabilities in the particular factual context.” Id.
(citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003)).
The facts upon which the probable cause finding is based must take into account the
officers’ expertise and experience. Chapman, 146 Idaho at 350, 206 P.3d at 554 (citing State v.
Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P.2d 894, 898 (Ct. App. 1991)). Although an arresting officer
is allowed some room for mistakes, the “mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts
leading sensibly to their conclusion of probability.” State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 137, 922 P.3d
1059, 1063 (1996) (quoting Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir. 1969)).

4

Amery did not cite or argue pursuant to the Idaho Constitution in her motion to suppress or brief
on appeal.
8

“When reviewing an officer’s actions the court must judge the facts against an objective
standard. That is, would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Julian,
129 Idaho at 136, 922 P.2d at 1062 (quotation marks omitted). “Because the facts making up a
probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint, the officer’s subjective
beliefs concerning that determination are not material.” Id. at 136-37, 922 P.2d at 1062-1063; see
also State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The facts making
up a probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint.”). Further, “[b]ecause
probable cause is an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to
arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.” D.C. v. Wesby,
___ U.S. ___, ___ n.2, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584 n.2 (2018).
Idaho Code § 18-705, the Idaho obstruct and delay statute, provides:
Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer,
in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office…is punishable
by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one (1) year.
This statute contains three elements: first, that the person who was resisted, delayed or
obstructed was a law enforcement officer; second, that the defendant knew that the person was an
officer; and third, that the defendant also knew at the time of the resistance that the officer was
attempting to perform some official act or duty. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d
1203, 1215 (2009).
With respect to the third element, the term “duty,” as used in the statute, encompasses only
“lawful and authorized acts of a public officer.” State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 180, 755 P.2d
471, 477 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, where an individual refuses to obey, or passively resists, an act
of a public officer that is contrary to the law, be it statute or constitution, that individual does not
9

violate I.C. § 18-705. -Id.; --see --also ------------State v. Hallenbeck, 141 Idaho 596, 599, 114 P.3d 154, 157
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho 14, 16, 27 P.3d 873, 875 (Ct. App. 2001); State
v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 502, 36 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Ct. App. 2001). For example, courts have
considered whether an officer’s order, which the defendant resisted or obstructed, violated the
defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures. See State v. George, 127
Idaho 693, 699, 905 P.2d 626, 632 (1995) (because traffic stop did not violate defendant’s right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the defendant unlawfully obstructed the
authorized duty of the officer by refusing to provide her driver’s license); Wiedenheft, 136 Idaho
at 15-16, 27 P.3d at 874-875 (whether defendant was entitled to obstruct the officer’s warrantless
entry into her home depended on whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement applied); State v. Gamma, 143 Idaho 751, 756, 152 P.3d 622, 627 (Ct. App. 2006)
(affirming conviction for obstructing officers where defendants failed to allege how officers’
orders that they leave a park violated their rights to due process, rights to be free from unreasonable
searches or seizures, or other constitutionally or statutorily protected rights); see
also ------Wright v.
- --Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 285-293 (1963) (because the officers’ commands violated the defendants’
constitutional rights, the defendants could not be punished for failing to obey the commands).
Otherwise, the duties of a police officer “are many and varied,” and resolution of the
question of what constitutes a duty “requires an exploration of the difficult, dangerous, and subtle
field where the essential office of the policeman impinges upon the basic freedom of the citizen.”
Wilkerson, 114 Idaho at 179, 755 P.2d at 476 (quoting Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598,
599 (1968) (J. Fortas concurring in dismissal)).
In this case, the district court properly concluded that the officers had probable cause to
arrest Amery for obstructing or delaying the exercise of their lawful duties. Specifically, the
10

officers had probable cause to arrest Amery because she refused two lawful orders to leave the
tense situation in the casino lobby, which interfered with the officers’ investigation of Casey; and
because she picked up the keys kicked to her by Casey and refused to drop them, despite being
present when Casey was lawfully ordered not to hand over the keys, and despite being told several
times to drop the keys once they were picked up. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded
that the arrest was lawful, and that the subsequent search of Amery’s purse was therefore a valid
inventory search.
1.

Amery’s Refusal To Leave The Casino Lobby

At different points in the encounter, both Officers Arellano and Ball told Amery to leave
the casino lobby during their investigation of Casey. Officer Arellano told Amery to sit outside
early in the investigation, while he was speaking with Casey. (R., p.162; State’s Exhibit A, 4:585:10; Supp. Tr., p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.1.) Amery eventually left, and then returned, at which time
Officer Ball told her to go back outside. (R., p.164; State’s Exhibit B, 2:35-2:45.) Amery
remained, and was the subject of a tense exchange between herself, Casey, and the officers about
her custodial status. (State’s Exhibit A, 9:40 – 10:35.)
Amery’s refusals to comply with the officers’ orders to leave the casino lobby provided the
officers probable cause to arrest her for obstructing and delaying their lawful duties. Arguing to
the contrary on appeal, Amery focusses on statements made by Officer Ball that Amery was on
“his reservation,” and that she was no longer permitted at the casino. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)
While Amery is correct that Officer Ball did not own the casino and had no authority to criminally
trespass her pursuant to I.C. § 18-7008(2)(a), this was not the source of the officers’ authority to
order her to leave.

11

Instead, the officers had lawful authority to investigate Casey’s possession of the pipe, and
to reasonably secure the scene to permit them to do so in a safe and timely matter. Amery was not
a mere bystander observing the officers’ investigation from a distance. It was immediately clear
that she was connected to Casey in some way. It was a reasonable exercise of the officers’
investigative duties to attempt to separate Amery and Casey. The purpose of such separation was
quickly illustrated by their communications while they were close together in the casino lobby,
and by their exchange of property. As the district court observed, “[i]n a contested detention and
arrest, such as occurred in this case, the level of emotion runs high,” and that Amery’s presence
(and subsequent retrieval of the keys, as discussed below), “clearly hindered the officers’
investigation of Casey by distracting the officers’ attention and by increasing Casey’s and Amery’s
tension in a moment already fraught with stress and pressure.” (R., p.174.)
Initially, if anything, the officers provided Casey and Amery more freedom of movement
then would have been lawfully required under the circumstances – Amery was not detained until
she was handcuffed after she grabbed the keys, and Casey was not handcuffed (and was permitted
to smoke a cigarette in the casino lobby), until this same time. (State’s Exhibit A, 6:50-13:15;
State’s Exhibit B, 2:35-3:40.) As the state argued to the district court (R., pp.78-80), the officers
likely had reasonable suspicion pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and based upon
Amery’s close proximity to the recovered contraband, to perform an investigative detention, and
more forcibly control Amery’s movements, before they did. The events of the encounter clearly
illustrate why it was reasonable for the officers to attempt to separate Casey and Amery during the
investigation to the extent they did. Further, the officers’ orders to leave the casino lobby did not
violate any of Amery’s statutory or constitutional rights. Therefore, Amery’s refusal to comply
with these orders provided probable cause for her arrest.
12

2.

Amery’s Recovery Of, And Refusal To Drop, The Keys

As the district court correctly concluded (R., pp.103-104), Amery’s actions to: (1) pick up
the keys that Casey kicked to her despite being present when Officer Arellano told Casey that he
could not transfer the keys to Amery; and (2) refuse to drop the keys after being ordered to do so
three times by Officer Ball, provided probable cause to arrest Amery for obstructing or delaying
the officers’ lawful duties.
On appeal, Amery argues that the officers had no lawful authority to attempt to prevent her
recovery of the keys, or to order her to drop them once she obtained them. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.13-15.) Amery notes that the keys themselves were not contraband; and argues that at the time
Casey tried to give her the keys, the officers did not have lawful authority to seize and search the
vehicle that Casey and Amery arrived in, and therefore, had no lawful authority to control
movement and possession of the keys. (Id.)
However, the relevant question is not whether the officers had probable cause to seize and
search the vehicle 5 (or to secure the vehicle while requesting a warrant to search it), but whether
the officers had the lawful authority to regulate a detained individual’s disposition of property.
Amery has cited no authority, below or on appeal, standing for the proposition that Casey, while
detained, had the constitutional or statutory right to distribute any of the property in his possession,
contraband or not.
Further, the keys had a particular relevance to the investigation. As the prosecutor
explained at the hearing on the motion to suppress (Supp. Tr., p.38, L.19 – p.39, L.7), the officers

5

The state does not concede that the officers lacked probable cause to search Casey’s and Amery’s
vehicle at this point. To the contrary, while this was not a traffic stop, it was likely that Casey had
recently possessed, in his car, the methamphetamine pipe he then dropped in the casino. There
was thus a probability that the car contained methamphetamine, or additional contraband.
13

could have sought a warrant to search the vehicle at some point in the course of the investigation.
Such a warrant request could have been based upon evidence that was already known to them
(Casey’s possession of a methamphetamine pipe, the likelihood that Casey and Amery drove to
the casino in a vehicle), and evidence that may have been subsequently uncovered in the
investigation. The officers were reasonably and lawfully entitled not just to secure Casey upon his
detention, but his possessions as the investigation continued as well.
Amery’s refusals to leave the casino lobby when ordered, her recovery of the keys, and her
refusal to drop the keys when ordered, individually and/or collectively, provided the officers
probable cause to arrest her for obstructing and delaying their lawful duties. Therefore, Amery
has failed to show that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s denial of Garritson’s
motion to suppress and Garritson’s judgment of conviction.
DATED this 12th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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